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The tangible presence of buildings and sites that speak of
other people and other times are a form of history and
enable us to chart some of the paths to the present and
the future.1
The preservation of our historic architectural landscapes
is as necessary as the preservation of our natural geographic
landscapes. 2 While the natural environment is graced by ma-
* The author dedicates this article to Barbara Shelton Wagner, with gratitude
for her insightful commentaries and guidance.
1. N. ROBINSON, REHABILITATING HISTORIC PROPERTIES 79 (1984) [hereinafter His-
TORIC PROPERTIES].
2. In the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. § 470
(1988), Congress recognized that historic architectural landmarks have tremendous
value for American citizens. The preamble to section 470 states, in pertinent part:
(b) The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) the spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected
in its historic heritage;
1
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jestic mountains and lakes, the urban environment is equally
enhanced by venerable edifices, which contribute "something
to the larger idea of the city, to the idea of a public realm that
everyone, including those who never had any reason to enter a
particular building, could benefit from."'3 Thus, historic pres-
ervation is an imperative because once destroyed, unique ar-
chitectural landscapes are irretrievably ruined."
Although beneficial to the intellectual and cultural life of the
public, landmark laws have been unpopular with landowners,
who perceive such laws as unjustified restraints on their abil-
ity to use their property.3 This tension has resulted in numer-
ous legal battles over the primacy of public and private
(2) the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be pre-
served as a living part of our community life and development in order to
give a sense of orientation to the American people;
(3) historic properties significant to the Nation's heritage are being lost or
substantially altered, often inadvertently, with increasing frequency;
(4) the preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so
that its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, eco-
nomic, and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future gener-
ations of Americans ....
Id.
3. Goldberger, The City That Was And the City That Is Now, N.Y. Times, Aug.
18, 1991, at 30, col. 1 [hereinafter The City That Was]. The benefit derived from an
urban architectural melange is encapsulated by author Penelope Lively in her novel,
CITY OF THE MIND. As the omniscent narrator, she describes the protagonist's reaction
to the city: "He sees a kaleidoscope of time and mood; buildings that ape Gothic
cathedrals, that remember Greek Temples, that parade symbols and images. He sees
columns, pediments and porticos. He sees Victorian stucco, twentieth-century con-
crete, a snatch of Georgian brick." P. LIVELY, CITY OF THE MIND 3 (1991).
4. For example, of the twelve thousand buildings listed in the Historic American
Building Survey conducted by the federal government in 1933, more than half have
been demolished. Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121,
133, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974) (Jasen, J., dissenting). Following World
War II, historic buildings were replaced by vacant lots and surface parking as the war
effort was redirected into construction and urban renewal. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON His-
TORIC PRESERVATION, TWENTY YEARS OF THE NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT 15
(1986) [hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT].
5. C. HAAR & J. KAYDEN, LANDMARK JUSTICE: THE INFLUENCE OF WILLIAM J. BREN-
NAN ON AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES 13 (1989) [hereinafter LANDMARK JUSTICE]; see also
Purdum, Church as Landmark: Battle Rejoined, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1991, at 27,
col. 1 [hereinafter Battle Rejoined]; Kennedy, Landmarking's Double-Edged Sword,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1991, § 10 (Real Estate), at 1; Crewdson, Ministry and Mortar:
Historic Preservation and the First Amendment After Barwick, 33 J. URB. & CON-




The goals of preservation must vie with the competing in-
terests of property owners. Since landmark litigation began,
courts have attempted to balance7 public and private rights,
and the importance of the interests involved:8
Judges must decide whether the government's purpose is
legitimate and whether the means chosen to achieve it are
reasonable. They must ascertain whether the asserted
purpose is the real one or whether it is being used as a
mask for illegitimate motivations .... They must deter-
mine whether government power, exercised to enforce the
will of the majority nevertheless must bend to higher
principles .... 
Typically, economics has been the dominant interest asserted
by property owners, who want to exploit the economic poten-
tial of their land to the fullest extent. Thus, owners claim that
by restricting alterations of their property, landmark laws ef-
fect a "taking" in violation of the fifth amendment."0 Yet, that
claim is no longer a viable threat to historic preservation.11
6. LANDMARK JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 154.
7. "A central theme of balancing may seem meek or contentless to some, particu-
larly to those favoring a single outcome-determinative theory. As a field, however,
land use does not lend itself easily to a unified theory." Id. at 194.
8. Id. at 13.
Distilled to its essence, a land use case presents a clash between private and
public rights. Property owners assert that the government has impermissibly
interfered with that bundle of rights called private property. Governments




10. The fifth amendment states, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. The pivotal case on this issue is Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central Transportation Company was the owner of
Grand Central Terminal, a 1913 French Beaux-Arts style masterpiece, which was des-
ignated a landmark in 1967. Id. The company wanted to construct a fifty-three story
building cantilevered above the terminal building, which entailed tearing down a por-
tion of the 42nd Street facade. Id. The company's applications for modifications (in
the form of a "certificate of no effect" or a "certificate of appropriateness," see infra
notes 36-51 and accompanying text), were denied by the New York City Landmarks
1991]
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During the past decade, however, the interest of religious free-
dom has emerged as the pre-eminent challenge to the goals of
preservation. Due to their intense spiritual, historic, and ar-
chitectural significance, religious buildings are designated as
landmarks more frequently than most other structures. 12 In-
creasingly, urban churches have become dissatisfied with their
landmark status. In support of their claims, these churches
contend that economic factors, such as dwindling congrega-
tions and increasing maintenance costs, make landmark status
uniquely burdensome for them as a group. Churches also
maintain that they should be allowed to modify their
landmarked structures in order to suit new purposes or gener-
ate additional income. 13
Municipal landmark laws are attacked by church owners
through diverse strategies. Some have petitioned for exemp-
tion from landmark laws." Other owners have openly defied
the law by drastically modifying or even demolishing their
landmarked structures, without the necessary prior approval
of a landmarks commission under the landmark laws.16 An-
Preservation Commission. The company argued that the Commission's denial of per-
mission to build the tower effected a "taking" in violation of the fifth amendment.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 108. The Court upheld the constitutional validity of the
Landmarks Law, stating that there had been no "taking" without just compensation.
Id. at 104.
12. In New York City, for example, out of the 600 buildings designated as
landmarks, fifteen percent are religious structures. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City
of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
"[C]hurches and synagogues are some of the most significant buildings in any com-
munity ... [and] in New York City the 18th and 19th century churches are among
the oldest buildings that remain." New York Institute on Architecture, 45 Occulus on
current new york architecture 3 (1983) [hereinafter Occulus].
13. See, e.g., Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmark Comm'n, 409 Mass. 38, 564
N.E.2d 571 (1990). The burden on church property owners is described as follows:
"Generally, landmark restrictions require churches to spend funds on the mainte-
nance and repair of their historic properties. Additionally, the church incurs costs
resulting from the requirement to negotiate successfully the time-consuming Commis-
sion procedures . . . . More importantly, the statutory requirement that churches
spend donation money on architectural preservation, could potentially discourage
new members from joining historic churches." Crewdson, Ministry and Mortar, supra
note 5 at 158-59.
14. See Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d 510, 496 N.E.2d
183, 505 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1986).
15. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, §§ 25-309 to -321 (1986); SEAT-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss2/9
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other tactic used by church owners has been to engage in liti-
gation against the municipalities, alleging that the landmark
laws violate the right to free exercise of religion under the first
amendment of the Constitution. 16
Recently, three cases were brought by religious property
owners challenging the constitutionality of municipal
landmark laws. The decisions reveal a potential conflict be-
tween the state and federal courts, and consequently, a threat
to preservation. In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle17
and Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n,1 8 the
highest Washington and Massachusetts state courts held that
the municipal landmark laws violated the right of free exer-
cise under the federal and state constitutions, respectively. By
contrast, the Second Circuit held, in St. Bartholomew's
Church v. City of New York," that New York City's landmark
law did not violate the right of free exercise under the federal
Constitution. The three 1990 cases encompass subsidiary is-
sues, such as: What test should courts apply to determine
whether the right of free exercise was violated? Should the
courts devise a special test for religious, as opposed to com-
mercial institutions? Should all municipal landmark laws be
held invalid as applied to religious properties?
The focus of this comment is upon these emerging con-
troversial issues in laidmark preservation. Part II describes
the purpose and regulatory operation of municipal landmark
laws. Part III discusses the factual and legal aspects of the
state court decisions in First Covenant and Society of Jesus.
Part IV discusses the facts surrounding St. Bartholomew's
Church, as well as the approach utilized by both the district
court and the Second Circuit. Part V compares the outcome of
TLE, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 25.12, §§ 25.12.010 to .910 (1977); 1975 Mass. Acts 772.
16. The first amendment states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
17. 114 Wash. 2d 392, 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct.
1097 (1991).
18. 409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990).
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the three cases and evaluates the implications of each court's
holding. Finally, Part VI analyzes the future of this conflict
between landmark preservation and religious freedom.
II. Statutory Background: Municipal Landmark Laws
A. Urban Imperatives
The moral imperatives to them were not stylistic but ur-
banistic. Both [architects] McKim and White loved the
city they were making, and believed deeply . . . that
buildings were in the city and of the city .... uplift[ing]
the public realm through an elegant facade, handsome de-
tailing and a respect for the street.2 0
Local governments have been at the forefront of the pres-
ervation movement since its inception in the United States.2 '
While a national preservation act was not passed until 1966,2
cities like Charleston and New Orleans enacted preservation
ordinances and constitutional amendments establishing his-
toric districts as early as 1931 and 1936.2' Effective preserva-
tion laws are an imperative in urban areas "where the forces
20. The City That Was, supra note 3, at col. 2.
Author Penelope Lively describes the value of architecture to a city, "The
resonances of the place are universal. If the city were to recount its experience, the
ensuing babble would be the talk of everytime and everywhere, of persecution and
disaster, of success and misfortune. The whole place is a chronicle, in brick and stone,
in silent eloquence, for those who have eyes and ears." P. LIVELY, CITY OF THE MIND
3-4 (1991).
21. ADvISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 15. Municipalities are empow-
ered to enact landmark laws pursuant to state enabling legislation. See, e.g., N.Y.
GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1989).
22. See supra note 2.
23. ADviSORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 27. Landmark laws must be
properly constructed in order to effectuate their purposes. For example, in 1925, a
French Quarter preservation group in New Orleans created the Vieux Carre District
Commission, "to protect the old colonial city from 'the encroachment of modern busi-
ness.'" HISTORIC PROPERTIES, supra note. 1 at 14. This enactment represented the
first municipal ordinance adopted in the United States for the protection of an his-
toric area. Ultimately the Commission was ineffective, because it could only "'study'
and 'make recommendations' and lacked the power to prevent the demolition of ar-
chitecturally significant buildings." Id. (quoting BAUMBACH, JIL, & BORAH, THE SEC-
OND BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS (1981)).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss2/9
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that produce physical change are most dynamic .... As urban
concentration increases, the demands for additional [ ] com-
mercial space become all the more incessant .... ,,24
Municipal landmark laws have in common a shared dis-
may at the rampant destruction of historic buildings in their
cities. This destruction,2 5 has resulted in a diminished urban
presence historically, aesthetically, and economically2 Eco-
nomic factors play a pivotal role in the enactment of
landmark laws, since cities are cognizant that their appeal to
tourists could not "be maintained or enhanced by disregard-
ing the historical and architectural heritage of the city and by
countenancing the destruction of such cultural assets. 2 7
Other economic benefits of preservation include increased
24. Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 134, 316
N.E.2d 305, 313, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 18 (1974) (Jasen, J., dissenting). A Massachusetts
court commented on similar urban pressures in Boston "[t]he [Back Bay] area's rich
background and character have led to its designation as a municipal historic district.
* . .Now, like most areas of Boston proper, the Back Bay is undergoing a wave of
renovation and new construction, including considerable commercial development."
Conservation Law Found. of New England v. Division of Water Pollution Control, 27
Mass. App. Ct. 544, 545, 495 N.E.2d 848, 849 (1986).
25. See supra note 4. For example, Pennsylvania Station in New York City,
designed by the famous Gilded Age architectural firm, McKim, Mead and White, rep-
resented an ingenious engineering solution to the problem of an urban railroad sta-
tion. The City That Was, supra note 3, at col. 3. When the station was demolished on
October 30, 1963, one reporter captured the horror of many as he wrote, "Until the
first blow fell .... no one was convinced that Penn Station really would be demol-
ished or that New York would permit this monumental act of vandalism .... N.
SILVER, LOST NEW YORK 37 (1967).
Thus, in 1965, especially aware of the vulnerability of historic structures follow-
ing the destruction of Pennsylvania Station, New York City wanted to prevent an-
other "monumental act of vandalism" and enacted its landmark law that year. Before
that time, there was no formal process to assess the alternatives to saving a building.
The New York Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, Occulus, supra note
12 at 5.
26. New York City found that many buildings "have been uprooted ... without
adequate consideration of the irreplaceable loss to the people of the city of the aes-
thetic, cultural and historic values [therein] represented ... 
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch.3, § 25-301(a) (1986).
27. Id. § 25-301(a). For example, municipalities such as Williamsburg and San
Francisco find that their historic sites, Colonial Williamsburg and Ghiaradelli Square,
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property values due to the prestige of landmark status.28 The
tax benefits of preservation are also substantial. In many situ-
ations historic properties receive tax deductions or exemp-
tions. Moreover, municipalities receive additional tax reve-
nues, since the uniqueness of the historic area draws new
merchants and business.29
Another reason for the preservation of historic buildings
was to bolster morale by "foster[ing] civic pride in the beauty
and noble accomplishments of the past . . . ,,-o The desire to
preserve buildings that embody segments of history has al-
ways provided a common foundation for preservation legisla-
tion.31 Yet, only recently have purely aesthetic concerns be-
come a legitimate basis for preservation.2 Because they have
a common impetus for their enactment, municipal landmark
laws express a similar purpose. For example, Boston's
landmark law states that its purposes include:
(a) to protect the beauty of the city of Boston and im-
prove the quality of its environment through identifica-
tion, recognition, conservation, maintenance and enhance-
ment of areas, sites, structures and fixtures which
constitute or reflect distinctive features of the political,
economic, social, cultural or architectural history of the
city;
(b) to foster appropriate use and wider public knowledge
and appreciation of such features, areas, sites, structures
and fixtures;
(c) to resist and restrain environmental influences adverse
to such purposes; and
28. HISTORIC PROPERTIES, supra note 1, at 80.
29. Id. at 80-81.
30. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-301(d) (1986).
31. See, e.g., Gray, A Window to the Past in the Present, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11,
1991, at 6.
32. Not surprisingly, New York City enacted its landmark law under the aus-
pices of its police powers. When the law was enacted in 1965, purely aesthetic con-
cerns alone were not considered a valid basis for legislation. Presently, aesthetics are
considered a valid base for land use regulation, and legislation need not "mask aes-
thetic concerns as public health, safety or welfare, in order to articulate a valid basis





(d) to encourage private efforts in support of such pur-
poses; and
(e) by furthering such purposes, to promote the public
welfare, to strengthen the cultural and educational life of
the city and the commonwealth and to make the city a
more attractive and desirable place in which to live and
work. s
Similarly, in 1965, the City of New York enacted its landmark
law in order to protect, enhance, and perpetuate those build-
ings or areas in the city which "reflect elements of the city's
cultural, social, economic, political and architectural history
Increasingly, cities became aware that "landmark
buildings and historic districts needed heightened legal pro-
tection against real estate market pressures [and] ... enacted,
strengthened or appiied with renewed vigor their landmark
preservation laws." 35
B. The Operation of Landmark Laws
Landmark laws work differently than the power of emi-
nent domain, where an entire parcel of private property is
taken. 6 A landmark law's "primary method of achieving its
goals is not by acquisitions of historic properties, but rather
by involving public entities in land use decisions affecting
these properties and providing services, standards, controls
and incentives that will encourage preservation by private
owners and users. '37
Municipal landmark laws follow a common statutory
scheme. The power to identify and designate buildings as
landmarks is generally vested in a commission. 38 A commis-
sion can be comprised of about nine to eleven members.3 9
33. 1975 Mass. Acts 772, § 1.
34. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-301(b) (1986).
35. LANDMARK JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 154.
36. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see
supra note 11.
37. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 109-10.
38. See, e.g., 1975 Mass. Acts 772, § 3.
39. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 74, § 3020(1) (1990).
1991]
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These commissions are highly diversified and expertised bod-
ies, whose members include: architects, historians, city plan-
ners, landscape architects, realtors, and local residents. 0
The designation of a landmark by the commission in-
volves a carefully-crafted procedure, designed to afford maxi-
mum due process to property owners. First, the commission
makes a preliminary designation of a building as a potential
landmark."1 This nomination can be made at the commission's
own initiative or at the request of others, but it must be based
upon whether the building conforms to the law's definition of
a "landmark." Typically, a "landmark" is defined as a build-
ing which is over twenty-five to thirty years old, and possesses
unique historic or aesthetic values.42
Second, the commission serves notice upon the landowner
and then holds a notice and comment period. This is followed
by a third step, a public hearing, where witnesses testify and
evidence is presented. The hearing provides a forum for all
interested parties to present their views on the designation.43
Finally, the commission's determination on whether the build-
ing will be designated a landmark is synthesized into a written
report. The commission's determination is typically subject
to approval of one or more governmental bodies before final
designation. Both reports are subject to approval by the city
council, which then holds another public hearing. 5
The regulatory process continues after a building is offi-
cially designated a landmark. The owner is required to main-
tain the structure "in 'good repair' to assure that the law's
objectives not be defeated by the landmark's falling into ir-
40. Members are typically appointed by the mayor and serve without compensa-
tion. See id. § 3020(2)(a).
41. Boston's landmark law provides that a preliminary designation shall require
"an investigation and report on the historical and architectural significance of the
structure, sites or objects to be designated," including an assessment of the property's
economic condition. 1975 Mass. Acts 772, § 4.
42. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-302(n) (1986). See also, SEATTLE,
WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 25.12, §§ 25.12.160, 25.12.350 (1977); but see, 1975 Mass. Acts
772, § 2 (no specific age requirement as a prerequisite for a landmark).
43. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-303 (1986).
44. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 25.12, § 25.12.430 (1977).




remedial disrepair.""6 Also, the owner cannot lawfully alter
the landmark in any way, even for repairs, without first secur-
ing approval of the commission in the form of a certificate.
When a certificate is granted, the determination signifies that
the proposed modifications are in harmony with the
landmark's qualities. The commission's approval of modifica-
tions usually is in the form of a "certificate of no effect," or a
"certificate of appropriateness" under New York's landmark
law. 4 7 In Boston, such written approval is known as either a
"certificate of exemption" or a "certificate of design ap-
proval," and in Seattle, a "certificate of approval."4
The certificate procedure is designed to ensure "that de-
cisions concerning construction on the landmark site are made
with due consideration of both the public interest in the
maintenance of the structure and the landowner's interest in
the use of the property.""9 To that end, denial of a certificate
by a commission is subject to judicial review, and the owner is
permitted to submit an unlimited number of modification
proposals to the commission. In addition, the owner can work
closely or consult with commission members to ensure the re-
sulting proposal will be approved.
The landmark laws specify those factors which the com-
mission must consider in deciding whether to grant a certifi-
cate. These factors typically include: 1) whether any exterior
architectural feature would be changed or destroyed; 2)
46. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 111-12; see supra note 11.
47. Under New York's law, an owner applies for a "certificate of no effect" when
the proposed alterations will not have an impact on the landmarked aspects of the
structure. A "certificate of appropriateness" or "approval," on the other hand, is
sought when the owner knows that the proposed alterations will significantly impact
the landmark. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-305(a)(1) (1986).
The statute states,
[iut shall be unlawful for any person in charge of a landmark site ... to alter,
reconstruct or demolish ... a part of such site ... unless the commission has
previously issued a certificate of no effect on protected architectural features
[or] a certificate of appropriateness or a notice to proceed authorizing such
work ....
Id.
48. 1975 Mass. Acts 772, § 5; SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 25.12, § 25.12.670
(1977).
49. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 112.
1991]
11
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
whether any new construction would affect or not be in har-
mony with the external appearance of the site; 3) the relation-
ship between such exterior architectural features of the pro-
posed new structure and the exterior architectural features of
the landmark; and 4) "the factors of aesthetic, historical and
architectural values and significance, architectural style, de-
sign, arrangement, texture, material and color."50
III. State Caselaw: Society of Jesus and First Covenant
During 1990, state courts demonstrated a tendency to
give religious property owners considerably more constitu-
tional protection under the free exercise clause than the fed-
eral courts. This trend is exemplified by Society,of Jesus v.
Boston Landmarks Commission,51 and First Covenant
Church v. City of Seattle.52
A. Society of Jesus
1. The Designation
The Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), owned The Church of
the Immaculate Conception in Boston, whose exterior is de-
scribed as "an outstanding example of mid-nineteenth century
renaissance revival architecture. ' 53 The interior is cited as one
of the best examples of ecclesiastical architecture in the coun-
try. Another exceptional feature of the church was a rare 1863
E. & G.G. Hook organ.54 According to the Jesuits' perception,
however, the structure was "an aging, oversized building," and
they felt the configuration of the interior no longer suited'
their current uses, due to "sparse attendance" at services.55
In 1986, without first obtaining a building permit, the
Jesuits decided to convert the church's interior from a house
50. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-307 (1986).
51. 409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990).
52. 114 Wash. 2d 392, 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct.
1097 (1991).
53. Society of Jesus, 409 Mass. at 40, 564 N.E.2d 571, 572.






of worship into: office space, living quarters, and counseling
facilities." The reconfiguration of the Immaculate Conception
Church interior entailed the removal of the existing main al-
tar, tabernacles, and altar tables.57 To that end, the church's
own officials began furtively destroying the interior of the
church in order to avoid landmark designation."8
The destruction of the church's interior provided the im-
petus for preservation groups to petition the Boston
Landmarks Commission (the Commission), to give temporary
landmark status to the church in 1987. In 1989, the Commis-
sion permanently designated part of the interior as a
landmark, under section 5 of the landmark law. 5e
2. The Litigation
The Jesuits appealed the Commission's designation of the
Immaculate Conception Church on constitutional grounds,
and the complaint challenged the facial validity of the
landmark law, claiming that "the mere designation of the
church as a landmark had violated their constitutional guar-
antee of the free exercise of religion" under federal and state
constitutions.6 Specifically, the Jesuits challenged the author-
ity of the Commission to designate the interior of a church as
a landmark, under the first amendment free exercise clause of
the federal Constitution and the Massachusetts State
Constitution."
The trial court held that the designation, apart from any
56. Id. The Jesuits also wanted to construct condominium units on adjacent
property. Id.
57. Society of Jesus, 409 Mass. at 40-41, 564 N.E.2d at 572.
58. NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, 8 PRESERVATION L. RPTR. 3007;
see also, Ministry and Mortar, supra note 5, at 158 n.153 (citing Angels with Dirty
Faces, Preservation News (1986)).
59. See 1975 Mass. Acts 772, §§ 5(a), 6, 7. Specifically, the portions that were
designated were the "nave, chancel, vestibule and organ loft on the main floor- the
volume, window glazing, architectural detail, finishes, painting, the organ and organ
case." Society of Jesus, 409 Mass. at 40, 564 N.E.2d at 572.
60. NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, supra note 53, at 3,008.
61. Id. at 3,009. While the appeal from the trial court was pending, the Jesuits
submitted another renovation plan which was approved by the Commission, and the
approved changes were made. Id.
1991]
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further regulation such as a "certificate of approval," violated
the free exercise clause of the first amendment. In its analysis,
the court decided that "the mere fact that the Jesuits hon-
estly perceived a restriction on this liturgically significant in-
terior structure tends to show the impact of the Landmark
Statute on their religious practices. '1 2
On appeal, the highest Massachusetts court affirmed the
trial court's holding, but only on state constitutional
grounds." In weighing the competing interests, the court ac-
knowledged that under the strict scrutiny test, employed in
the analysis of constitutional issues, the practice of religion
may be regulated in the face of a "compelling" state interest.
The strict scrutiny analysis is triggered when a plaintiff shows
that a fundamental right, such as free exercise of religion, was
infringed upon by government action.6 4 As a result of such
showing, the court must demand that the government entity
show that either "the State does not. deny the free exercise of
religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a [compel-
ling] state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the in-
terest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause."65
The court found that the state's interest in historic pres-
ervation did not rise to the level of a "compelling" interest,
because only grave abuses warrant impingement on the right
of free exercise. Citing to court decisions on religious freedom
from 1779, 1817, and 1913,66 the court asserted the primacy of
religious freedom in the founding of its state and in the nation
62. Id. at 3,010.
63. Society of Jesus, 409 Mass. at 43, 44, 564 N.E.2d at 571, 574. The relevant
state constitutional provision Article II, states, in pertinent part:
[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or
estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to the
dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession or sentiments;
provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their
religious worship.
MASS. CONST. part 1, art. II.
64. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 114 Wash. 2d 392, 787 P.2d 1352
(1990) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)).
65. Id. at 403, 787 P.2d at 1358 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972)).
66. Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 340, 346 (1817), Opinion of the Justices, 214 Mass.





The government interest in historic preservation, though
worthy, is not sufficiently compelling to justify restraints
on the free exercise of religion, a right of primary impor-
tance. In short, under our hierarchy of constitutional val-
ues we must accept the possible loss of historically signifi-
cant elements of the interior of this church as the price of
safeguarding the right of religious freedom."
According to the court, it was significant that the Com-
mission designated the interior, because "[t]he configuration
of the church interior is so freighted with religious meaning
that it must be considered part and parcel of the Jesuits' reli-
gious worship. The government intrusion here is substantially
more invasive, reaching into the church's actual worship space
",08
Another fact significant to the court's holding was that
their state constitution guaranteed religious freedom, and this
guarantee was limited only by the government's ability to reg-
ulate religious practices for behavior that was disturbing ei-
ther the public peace or the religious worship of others.69
Since the Jesuits' proposed renovations would not warrant ap-
plication of either limitation, the landmark regulations were




In October 1980, First Covenant Church (the Church)
was nominated for landmark status under the recently
adopted Seattle Landmarks Preservation Ordinance.70 The
67. Society of Jesus, 409 Mass at 43, 564 N.E.2d at 571, 574.
68. Id. at 42, 564 N.E.2d at 573.
69. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
70. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 25.12, §§ 25.12.010 to .910 (1977); First Cove-
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Seattle Landmarks Preservation Board (the Board) voted to
designate the church as a landmark. At a public hearing in
January- 1981, the church objected to the designation. In
April, the Board recommended the adoption of controls to
preserve First Covenant's exterior, to which the church also
objected.71 To resolve these differences, the city arranged for a
hearing with a hearing examiner under the procedures out-
lined in the landmarks law. 72 After an additional public hear-
ing, the examiner concurred with the board and recommended
adoption of the controls. These controls remained in effect
until 1985, when First Covenant was officially designated a
landmark.
2. The Litigation
In 1986, the Church challenged the City of Seattle, claim-
ing that the designation of churches as landmarks was uncon-
stitutional .7  The trial court granted summary judgment to
the city, finding that the claim was not ripe, since the Church
had not submitted a proposal for alteration to the Board. The
Supreme Court of Washington, however, found a justiciable
controversy existed. 4
71. Among these controls was a requirement that the church must obtain a cer-
tificate of approval prior to altering the landmark for structural changes necessitating
a building permit. First Covenant, 114 Wash. 2d at 406, 787 P.2d at 1360.
72. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 25.12.560 (1977).
73. First Covenant, 114 Wash. 2d at 395, 787 P.2d at 1353.
74. Under the Washington State Uniform Judgments Act, four elements must be
present in a case in order for it to satisfy the ripeness doctrine. Id. These elements
are: 1) an actual dispute between parties of genuinely opposing interests which are
concrete and substantial; and 2) a judicial determination of the matter will prove
conclusive. The church satisfied these prerequisites by enumerating the manner in
which the landmark designation itself already interfered with their religious freedom,
even if they never applied for alterations. These limitations included:
(1)interfering with the church's freedom to alter the exterior of the church
structure
(2)necessary secular approval of any proposed alteration of the facade
(3)a limitation on the church's ability to sell its property
(4)uncertainty of the discretionary approval confronting the church, and
(5)depreciation in value of property from $70,000 to $40,000 as a result of
being landmarked.




The issue was framed as "whether the law should prefer
religious freedom or an exercise of the police power to main-
tain the architectural and cultural interests associated with
landmark preservation. ' 75 Conceding that religious freedom
was not completely immune from legitimate regulations in the
face of compelling governmental interests, the court neverthe-
less concluded that freedom of religion is in a "preferred posi-
tion. ' " The test employed to analyze issue was the strict scru-
tiny analysis.
The court held that the Seattle Landmarks Ordinance vi-
olated the right of free exercise under both the federal and
state constitutions.7 7 Ultimately, the First Covenant court,
citing the dissent in the Barwick case in New York,7 8
concluded:
[B]alancing the right of free exercise with the aesthetic
and community values associated with landmark preser-
vation, we find that the latter is clearly outweighed by the
constitutional protection of free exercise of religion and
the public benefits associated with the practice of reli-
gious worship within the community.79
The court found that the operation of the landmark law
on First Covenant Church placed the Church in a position
where matters potentially affecting their practice of religion
necessitated secular approval. The court was unimpressed
with a "liturgy exception" in the designating ordinance,
whereby certain alterations did not require the commission's
approval. Under the "liturgy exception," "nothing herein shall
prevent any alteration of the exterior when such alterations
are necessitated by changes in liturgy, it being understood
that the owner is the exclusive authority on liturgy "8.... 0
75. Id. at 400, 787 P.2d at 1356.
76. Id. (quoting Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)).
77. Id. at 395, 787 P.2d at 1353-54.
78. Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d 510, 496 N.E.2d 183,
505 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1986).
79. First Covenant, 114 Wash. 2d at 409, 787 P.2d at 1361.
80. Id. at 406, 787 P.2d at 1360 (emphasis omitted).
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The court found the "liturgy exception" to be "a vague
standard which does not withstand close scrutiny." 81 Because
the liturgy describes the portion of religion transpiring inside
the church, with no applicability to the exterior, the infringe-
ment on the church's free exercise rights was not lessened.82
The court also found unconstitutional a proviso to the liturgy
exception which required that when the church applies for an
architectural change necessitated by changes in the liturgy,
the Board must issue the certificate of approval. Before the
Board issues the certificate, however, the "Board and owner
shall jointly explore .. .possible alternative design solutions
.. . ." The court concluded that requiring a church to nego-
tiate with a secular body, "creates unjustified governmental
interference in religious matters . "..."84
Under the First Covenant court's analysis, the City of Se-
attle did not prevail because it failed to meet its burden of
proof under the strict scrutiny test. The court held "that the
preservation of historical landmarks is not a compelling state
interest," because the health or safety of citizens was not in-
volved, but rather a matter of urban aesthetics."85 The court
based its evaluation of the worthiness of the state's interest on
its reading of the Penn Central case.86 According to the
Washington court, the Court in Penn Central, had applied a
minimum scrutiny test to the New York City Landmark Law.
This test merely required the governmental entity to show a
"substantial relation" between the government interest and
the means chosen to achieve that interest.8 7 The minimum
scrutiny test was sufficient in Penn Central because, the
Washington court decided, there was no allegation that a fun-
damental right had been violated. The First Covenant court
decided that, had it applied a strict scrutiny test, the Supreme
81. Id. at 407, 787 P.2d at 1360.
82. Id.
83. Id (emphasis omitted).
84. Id. at 408, 787 P.2d at 1360.
85. Id. at 409, 787 P.2d at 1361.
86. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see
supra note 11.




Court would have held the New York City Landmark Law
unconstitutional.
IV. Federal Caselaw: St. Bartholomew's Church
A. The Designation
Located on Park Avenue at the corner of 49th and 50th
streets in Manhattan, St. Bartholomew's Church property
consists of the 1919 church building and the 1928 community
house, which are situated on a corner lot with a surrounding
garden area.88 In 1967, the church building and the commu-
nity house were individually designated as landmarks under
section 25-303 of the Landmark Law of New York, following a
year of public hearings.8
St. Bartholomew's Church and community house are out-
standing modern versions of Romanesque and Byzantine ar-
chitecture in the United States.90 As part of the designation
process, the New York City Landmark Commission issued a
report which explains why St. Bartholomew's embodies a
"special historical and aesthetic interest and value as part of
the development, heritage and cultural characteristics of New
York City."91 The designation report states that the church
features:
[A] frieze of low relief sculpture, . . . [and] bronze doors,
whose panels depict Old and New Testament themes,...
considered by many critics to be the finest of their kind in
the City. The clerestory walls of the nave rise high ...
88. The New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, Designation Re-
port: St. Bartholomew's Church and Community House, Number 1, LP-0275, March
16, 1967 [hereinafter Designation Report].
89. Id. The Commission held numerous public hearings on the designation of the
church from May 1966 through January 1967. Significantly, "There were no speakers
in opposition to the designation at any hearing." Id. See also NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN
CODE ch. 3, § 25-303 (1986), which states, in pertinent part: "[T]he commission shall
have the power, after a public hearing: (1) To designate ... a list of landmarks which
are identified by a description setting forth the general characteristics and location
thereof ...." Id.
90. Designation Report, supra note 88.
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and are pierced for almost their entire length by large,
round-arched windows. A beautiful rose window, with in-
tricate tracery, lights the south wall of the shallow tran-
sept . . . . [A]top a high drum, sits the octagonal dome
sheathed with tiles and marbles in highly colored and in-
tricate designs .... When this handsome dome glitters in
the sun, its brilliance offers a glowing contrast to its
surroundings.2
Architect Bertram Goodhue designed the church building in
1917, skillfully incorporating a triple-porticoed porch from the
church's previous location, which was designed by McKim,
Mead and White in 1902.9-
In 1926, Goodhue's associates created the plans for an ad-
joining, seven-story, terraced community house. Like the
church building, the community house is distinguished by an
unusual polychromatic appearance, achieved through the
combination of salmon-colored brick, grey Cippolino marble,
limestone, and tiles of varying hues.9 The Commission recog-
nized the importance of the community house to the
landmark site and noted:
[T]he style of this building is well suited to its functional
requirements, it harmonizes with the Church through the
use of the same warm-colored building materials, the con-
tinuation of the limestone band courses from the Church
and chapel, and the interspersing of decorative details
similar in character and scale to those used in the con-
struction of the main house of worship.
9 5
This relationship of the church and community house illus-
trates landmarks which are integral to each other, since the
two buildings act as complimentary foils.9 6
92. Designation Report, supra note 88.
93. See supra note 3. The porch was built in honor of the railroad tycoon Corne-
lius Vanderbilt. J. TAURANAC, ELEGANT NEW YORK, THE BUILDERS AND THE BUILDINGS
1885-1915, at 82-83 (1985).
94. Id.
95. Designation Report, supra note 88.




B. The Application for a Certificate of Appropriateness
"[Plarticularly when the setting is a dramatic and inte-
gral part of the original concept .... [W]e must preserve
them in a meaningful way - with alterations . . . [that]
enhance and perpetuate the original design rather than
overwhelm it."97
As with many landmarks, St. Bartholomew's was devoted
to one use for over seventy years. In 1983, however, the Rec-
tors and Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church (the Church),
were offered 551 million dollars by a British developer to de-
molish the community house and replace it with a fifty-nine
story office tower. The Church claimed that the community
house, in its present condition, was inadequate for the
Church's needs, and that a new building was necessary. In ad-
dition, the Church wanted to use the rental income from the
tower to provide financing for Church activities and
charities."'
Given the landmark designation, the Church was required
to secure the approval of the Commission prior to altering the
site.99 From 1984 to 1986, the Commission held public hear-
ings and conducted site visits to determine whether to grant
the Church's three separate applications for a "certificate of
appropriateness.' ' 00 Ultimately, the Commission denied all
turally harmonious buildings:
The commission may designate any area in the city as a protection area as
herein provided upon a finding by the commission that the area to be desig-
nated is visually related to the landmark .... In determining the boundaries
of a protection area, the commission shall consider the following elements: (a)
major views and vistas of and from the landmark ....
1975 Mass. Acts 772, § 2.
97. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 118 (1978) (quot-
ing the Landmarks Commission's designation report for Grand Central Station).
98. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
99. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
100. St. Bartholomew's Church, Community House, Gardens & Terraces, LPC
86-0345, (New York City Landmarks Preservation Comm'n 1986)(determination). At
these hearings, expert witnesses testified and written reports were submitted, all of
which went to form the administrative record used by the district court. See infra
1991]
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three applications.-"'
The Church's second application differed from the first in
that the Church proposed an office tower with forty-nine sto-
ries instead of fifty-nine.102 The third application differed
from the first two in that the Church claimed an exemption
from the requirement of securing a "certificate of appropriate-
ness" on the grounds of the "hardship exemption"103 to the
landmark law. 04 Essentially, the "hardship exemption" re-
quires proof by the owner that the property, in its
landmarked state, cannot earn a "reasonable return.' ' 0 5 Spe-
cifically, the Church had to prove that it' met four elements
outlined in section 25-309,10° showing that it should be ex-
empted because: 1) the owner had entered into a bona fide
agreement to sell the property; 2) the existing community
house would not be capable (if it were not already tax-ex-
empt) from earning a reasonable return; 3) the community
house was inadequate for the Church's purposes; and 4) the
buyer intended to demolish the building. 07 The Commission
denied the third application because the evidence presented
did not support the elements required for a hardship claim. 0 8
C. The Litigation
1. The District Court's Decision
After the third application for a "certificate of appropri-
ateness" was denied, the Church filed suit for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the City of New York and the
notes 110-137 and accompanying text.
101. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 961-62.
102. Id. at 961.
103. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE CH. 3, § 25-309 (1986). The determination of
whether to grant the third application necessitated five Executive Sessions of the
Commission, which were also open to the public.
104. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 961.
105. A "reasonable return" is defined as "a net annual return of six per centum
of the valuation [of the property]." NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-302(v)
(1986).
106. Id. § 25-309.
107. Id. § 25-309(a)(2)(a-d).




Landmark Preservation Commission of the City of New York
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,109 alleging deprivation of its rights
under the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments. 110 The
Church challenged the landmark law both on its face and as
applied. The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants on the issues of the facial validity of the landmark
law, and held that the law was not unconstitutional on its face
as applied to all churches."' A bench trial was held on the
issues concerning the unconstitutionality of the landmark law
as applied to St. Bartholomew's by conducting a de novo re-
view of the evidence before the Commission."'
a. The First Amendment 'Free Exercise' Issue
The free exercise clause of the first amendment states, in
pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion or the free exercise thereof ...." As
a religious institution, the Church claimed that the landmark
law violated its right of free exercise because the denial of the
"certificate of appropriateness" restricted its freedom to use
its property as the Church saw fit. The law hindered the fur-
therance of the Church's religious mission by preventing the
demolition the community house. 114
The community house serves a variety of functions, in-
cluding athletic facilities, such as a pool and a basketball
court, a theater, a pre-school, meeting rooms, kitchen and din-
ing facilities, and office space. In conjunction with the church
building, the community house also provides sleeping quarters
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). This federal statute creates an action for a person
who has suffered a constitutional violation at the hands of the state or one of its
agencies, such as a municipality. Section 1983 states, "Every person who, under color
of any state statute, ordinance [or] regulation ... subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law." Id.
110. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 960.
111. Id. at 963-65.
112. Id. at 965. To illustrate the extent of the commission's investigation of this
matter, the court notes that the evidence comprising the administrative record was
twenty-three volumes in length. Id.
113. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
114. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 963.
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for the homeless.1 1 5
Relying upon the Supreme Court's free exercise standard
set forth in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Assn.,"' the district court held that the landmark designation
did not violate the Church's free exercise right." 7 In Lyng, the
Court enunciated a two-pronged test for determining whether
there had been a violation of the free exercise clause: 1)
whether the governmental action has coerced individuals into
violating their religious beliefs; or 2) whether the governmen-
tal action serves to penalize in such a way as to deny the
plaintiffs an equal share of the rights, benefits and privileges
enjoyed by other citizens." 8
In formulating the test, the Court found "prohibit" to be
the operative word in the free exercise clause. Thus, when
government action only incidentally burdens, and does not
prohibit, the practice of religion, it does not rise to a level of
constitutional significance. The governmental entity in such a
case is not required to justify its action by showing a compel-
ling interest."' To prevail under either prong of the Lyng test,
the plaintiff must show that the government action imposes
an impermissible burden upon religion. Only then will the
115. Id. at 961.
116. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). A federally-funded road project was planned for a seg-
ment in the National Forest. A government study found that the land was sacred
Indian tribal ground, used for religious purposes. The Court held that the free exer-
cise clause was not violated because the road project would not coerce the Indians
into repudiating their beliefs, nor would it penalize their religion in a unique way. Id.
117. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 963.
118. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 446. For an illustration of a violation of the Lyng test, the
Court cited Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, unemployment ben-
efits were denied an applicant who refused to accept work requiring her to work on
Saturdays because it was a holy day in her religion. The Court found the denial con-
travened the Constitution because it imposed a fine upon religious worship. Id.
119. Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1988). In
Yonkers Racing, a seminary petitioned the court to enjoin the city from condemning
its property on the ground that their free exercise right would be violated. The court
remanded the case on the first amendment issue, but said the court should accept as
true the affidavit of the rector, who stated that the seminary could not carry out its
mission if two acres of its property were condemned. The court determined that when
a proposed government action would substantially affect religious practice, there ex-
ists at least a material issue of fact concerning whether the state has interfered with
the right of free exercise. Id.
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss2/9
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governmental entity be required to show a compelling inter-
est. If the plaintiff cannot show this level of discrimination,
"the state need only show a rational basis for the legislation.
The [New York City landmark law] has such a rational
basis."3 0
The establishment clause, which prohibits "an excessive
entanglement between government and religion," was the ba-
sis for the Church's second claim under the first amend-
ment. 21 The establishment clause was implicated because, in
order to determine whether an applicant's hardship claim is
valid, the landmark law authorizes the Commission to inquire
into the applicant's financial status; an inquiry which the
Church claimed was excessive and constitutionally impermis-
sible. The court determined that the entanglement doctrine
was not applicable, because the clause is violated only where a
statute requires "extensive and continuous monitoring" '122 of
religious institutions which are receiving some form of state
aid.' The landmark law, by contrast, entails only a brief, sin-
gle inquiry into the church's financial situation, and is thus
constitutionally permissible.1 24
120. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 963, n.9. (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd,
914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991). The court refers to
the Penn Central case in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Landmarks Law. Penn Central Transp. Co, v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
121. Id. at 963.
122. Id.
123. Id. To illustrate this principle, the court noted two cases: Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1976), and NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490
(1979). In Lemon, a state statute which provided state aid to religious schools was
held unconstitutional because the purpose of the statute was to entangle the state in
the administrative details of the school. While noting that the Constitution does not
require complete separation between church and state, the Court stated, "a statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
NLRB involved teachers, represented by unions, against religious schools, who
refused to bargain with the unions. The Court denied the request of the National
Labor Relations Board to assume jurisdiction over the conflict, because of the danger
of a government infringement upon religion. NLRB, 440 U.S. at 507.
124. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 963.
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b. The Unconstitutional-as-Applied Claims
The Church also claimed that even if the landmark law
was not unconstitutional on its face, it was unconstitutional as
applied to their church. The basis of the allegation was that
the landmark designation and the subsequent denial of three
applications for modifications prevented the Church from
practicing its religious beliefs. Their argument was predicated
on establishing that the existing community house was inade-
quate for their present and future needs, and the denial of the
certificate would cause the Church to lose valuable revenue to
fund charitable programs. Given the specific claims presented
by the Church under the first and fifth amendments, the court
recognized that "in this case, the first amendment inquiry is
identical in scope to the fifth amendment inquiry, since to
prevail on either claim the plaintiff must prove that it can no
longer carry out its religious mission in its existing facili-
ties."'125 The standard adopted by the district court was devel-
125. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 966. The fifth amendment
states, in pertinent part: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. As applied to St. Bartholomew's, the
Church explained, the Landmark Law has severely curtailed its ability to use the
property as it desires and that therefore a "taking" was effected in violation of the
fifth amendment. The standard that the district court used to assess the fifth amend-
ment claim was whether the landmark designation prevents or seriously interferes
with the carrying out of the charitable or religious purpose of the institution. The
district acknowledged that "the Supreme Court has never passed upon the constitu-
tionality of regulations, such as landmark laws, as applied to the property of a chari-
table or religious institution." Id. Thus, the court borrowed an analogy from the only
Supreme Court precedent on the Landmark Law: Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Yet, Penn Central was of limited utility to this court
because it pertained to takings of commercial properties. The St. Bartholomew's
court found that certain factors enumerated in the Penn Central case were still rele-
vant to charitable properties. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp at 966. These
included (1) "the economic impact of the government action (did the government
action interfere with legitimate investment expectations?), and [(2)] the character of
the government action, (is the action a physical taking or a land use regulation?)."
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. Thus, the concepts of the "owner's primary expec-
tations" and "reasonable beneficial use" were to play a role in the fifth amendment
analysis.
The district court in St. Bartholomew's used a second analogy from federal pre-
cedent. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., the Court deter-
mined that government action violates the free exercise clause only if it prohibits a




oped by the New York State courts in determining whether
there had been a taking of charitable property in two cases:
Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York 126 and Society
for Ethical Culture v. Spatt.27
In Ethical Culture, the Society's meeting house was des-
ignated a landmark, and the Society alleged that the New
York City landmark law resulted in a violation of the free ex-
ercise and takings clauses of the Constitution. The court dis-
missed the claims, stating that while the designation does im-
pact the Society's use of the land, the test is "whether the
impact on the Society and its charitable activities is so severe
that the regulations become confiscatory."12 8 In addition to
meeting these standards, the church would have to show that
it could not afford to make the existing facilities adequate for
its needs. For example, in Lutheran Church the court held
that the application of the landmark law was unconstitutional
because the designation would result in a complete cessation
of the church's charitable activities. Previously, the church at-
tempted to modify the structure to suit its needs, to no
avail.2 9
To apply the standards enunciated in Lutheran Church
and Ethical Culture to the facts of St. Bartholomew's
Church, the trial court conducted a de novo review of the fac-
tual findings resulting from the administrative hearings con-
ducted by the Commission. The Church, among others had
submitted reports addressing: (1) the adequacy of the commu-
nity house for the Church's charitable programs, (2) the ne-
cessity and cost of structural and mechanical repairs for the
Church building and community house, and (3) the Church's
financial condition.130
To decide the first issue of the adequacy of the commu-
nity house, the court carefully scrutinized the reports and de-
termined that while the community house needed repair,
(quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)).
126. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
127. 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980).
128. Id. at 454, 415 N.E. 2d at 925, 434 N.Y.S. 2d at 934.
129. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
130. See St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 958.
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demolition was too drastic a remedy."3 ' Further, in examining
the plans for the Church's community space in the proposed
office tower, the court discovered that, for various reasons, the
new space would be even more unsuitable than the existing
community house. Due to this evidence, the court held that
the "plaintiff has failed to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it can no longer conduct its charitable activities
or carry out its religious mission in its existing facilities ...
therefore, plaintiff's first and fifth amendment claims [as ap-
plied] must be rejected.' 132
An analysis of the second issue, concerning the necessity
of repair to the community house, revealed that the true cost
of repair was not fourteen million dollars as the Church's re-
ports estimated, but was instead three million dollars. 3 This
fact was considered for the analysis of the third issue, the
Church's ability to pay the costs of repair.
In examining the evidence on the Church's financial con-
dition, the court discovered that the Church's records showed
a stock portfolio worth over twelve million dollars, and income
generated by investments and contributions which totaled
over fourteen million dollars.' 3 4 Once these facts were re-
vealed, the court held that the Church's hardship claim, under
the landmark law was without merit, since they had ample
assets. 13 The court concluded that "the Church has failed to
show that it cannot afford to pay for those necessary repairs
and rehabilitation."' 36
2. The Second Circuit's Decision
On appeal, the Church challenged only the dismissal of
131. Id. at 968.
132. Id. at 974.
133. Id. at 972.
134. Id. at 973.
135. The Church also claimed that despite its assets, it could not run its charita-
ble programs while expending three million for repairs, and that New York State law
constrained its ability to spend its money for repairs. The court dispelled the validity
of both claims. Id.




its first and fifth amendment claims. 37 Specifically, the
Church disputed the district court's factual findings on
whether the existing community house was adequate, whether
the cost of repair was exaggerated, and whether the price of
repair was affordable.' s
The Second Circuit framed the issue before them as:
"[W]hether a church may be prevented [by the landmark law]
from replacing a church-owned building with an office tower?"
and answered in the affirmative.' 39 The court of appeals af-
firmed the holding of the district court, determining that the
first and fifth amendment claims were correctly decided with
the proper legal standard applied."' Under the applicable
standard the Church must "prove that the landmark regula-
tion prevented the Church from carrying out its religious and
charitable mission in its current buildings.""' Yet, unlike the
district court, the court of appeals had the benefit of recent
Supreme Court precedent to guide its determination of the
applicable standard. During the period between the decision
of the district court in January 1990 and the court of appeals
in September 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment
Div. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith."2
In Smith, the Court held that the free exercise clause did
not prohibit the State of Oregon from applying its drug laws
to the religious use of the drug peyote. 43 The Second Circuit
summarized the import of this caselaw and stated that after
Smith,
the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
137. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F. 2d 348, 350 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
138. Id. at 353. The court of appeals also affirmed the denial of intervention to a
group opposed to the sale of St. Bartholomew's, and conferral of status as amicus
curiae. Id. at 360.
139. Id. at 350.
140. Id. at 351.
141. Id. "A group's religious 'mission' is the central expression of its belief sys-
tem, used to carry out the mandates of conscience." Ministry and Mortar, supra note
5, at 158.
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the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law pros-
cribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes
(or proscribes) .... The critical distinction is thus be-
tween a neutral, generally applicable law that happens to
bear on religiously motivated action, and a regulation that
restricts certain conduct because it is religiously
oriented.14'
Although the Church proffered statistics showing that, of the
six hundred landmarked sites in the City, over fifteen percent
were religious properties, the court of appeals concluded that
the landmark law was a facially neutral regulation of general
applicability. While the landmark law can affect activities as-
sociated with religious beliefs, the court stated, it does not
regulate the beliefs themselves, and was therefore constitu-
tionally permissible. 145
The Church had argued that the landmark law was not a
neutral regulation, like a zoning law, because the Commission
exercises discretion that may be discriminatory. In the ab-
sence of evidence of intentional discrimination by the Com-
mission in exercising its discretion, the court held the statisti-
cal allegations could not support a constitutional claim. 146
Additionally, the Church persisted, neutral regulations benefit
everyone equally, and the landmark law does not benefit the
owner at all, only those in the surrounding area. Finally, the
Church compared the landmark law with discriminatory "re-
verse spot" zoning."17 Rejecting these arguments, the court ex-
plained that zoning laws are not immune from biased or polit-
ical interests. The owner of a property in an area where
zoning laws apply does not always feel benefitted by the regu-
lation. The zoning-landmark law analogy created by the
Church ultimately was not apt, the court concluded, because,
144. St. Bartholomew's Church. 914 F.2d at 354 (quoting Smith, 110 S. Ct. at
1600).
145. St. Bartholomew's Church, 914 F.2d at 354-55.
146. Id. at 355.
147. 'Reverse-spot zoning' is "a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a





In contrast to discriminatory zoning, which is the antithe-
sis of land-use control as part of some comprehensive
plan, the New York City law embodies a comprehensive
plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest
wherever they might be found in the city .... 14
The court analyzed the issue of whether the landmark
law, by preventing the Church from constructing the office
tower, and thus reducing the potential income the Church
could earn on its property, contravenes the free exercise
clause. "1 9 Reiterating the analysis enunciated in Lyng, the
court stated that direct or indirect coercion of religious be-
liefs, or severe penalties prohibiting the practice of religion,
were unconstitutional. 150 Under that standard, even tech-
niques amounting to indirect coercion and penalties upon free
exercise will rise to a level of constitutional significance.'15
However, the court stated, if a plaintiff cannot show a dis-
criminatory motive, and the government action exerts merely
incidental effects upon religion, the plaintiff will not pre-
vail." 2 Unless a fundamental right, such as religion, is impli-
cated, the strict scrutiny standard will not be applied. Such
justification is necessary only when the government action im-
poses a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. ss
The court of appeals reviewed the fifth amendment claim
and upheld the district court's dismissal. The commercial
148. Id. (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132.).
149. The court assessed two Supreme Court decisions which pertained to that
issue: Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990), and
Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 400 U.S. 680 (1989). In Jimmy
Swaggart, the court held that a generally applicable sales and use state tax on plain-
tiffs property which diminished its income, did not impose a significant burden upon
the free exercise of religion. The court in Hernandez paraphrased the Lyng test and
phrased the issue as "whether government has placed a substantial burden upon the
observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling
government interest justifies the burden." The Court answered in the negative. Her-
nandez, 400 U.S. 682, 699 (1989).
150. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
151. St. Bartholomew's Church, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1103 (1991).
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properties test in Penn Central"" was controlling for charita-
ble properties, the court stated, because the judicial determi-
nation presented the same constitutional question of "whether
the land-use regulation impairs the continued operation of the
property in its originally expected use. ' 155 The Second Circuit
concluded that the landmark law does not effect a taking be-
cause the Church can continue its existing charitable and reli-
gious activities in its current facilities just as it had done prior
to obtaining landmark status.
V. Analysis
Judges must decide whether the government's purpose is
legitimate and whether the means chosen to achieve it are
reasonable. They must ascertain whether the asserted
purpose is the real one or whether it is being used as a
mask for illegitimate motivations. '56
In Society of Jesus, First Covenant, and St. Bartholo-
mew's Church, the state and federal judges differed in decid-
ing whether the governments' purpose was legitimate and
achieved in a reasonable way. These three cases are important
to landmarks preservation because they illustrate the cam-
paign currently being waged by religious property owners,
challenging the landmark law on a first amendment basis.
According to the highest courts of Washington and Mas-
sachusetts, municipal landmark laws contravene the free exer-
cise clause by the mere fact of designation of churches
alone. 1 57 By contrast, the Second Circuit determined that
neither the designation nor the subsequent regulation of
churches as landmarks denies the religious their constitutional
rights.158 The Second Circuit determined that historic preser-
154. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
155. St. Bartholomew's Church, 914 F.2d at 356.
156. LANDMARK JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 13.
157. Society of Jesus, 409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990); First Covenant, 114
Wash. 2d 392, 787 P.2d 1352 (1990).
158. St. Bartholomew's Church, 914 F.2d 348, 353-54 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,




vation was a legitimate purpose for New York City, and the
law was a reasonable means of achieving that purpose. Addi-
tionally, the operation of the landmark law was not analogous
to discriminatory practices such as spot-zoning.' 59
Both the trial and appellate courts in St. Bartholomew's
Church carefully analyzed the facts and found that the
church's free exercise claim was in fact "a mask for illegiti-
mate motivations.' 0 The deceptive aspect of the church's
claim was twofold. First, the church's position that they could
not afford the cost of repair or that they desperately needed
funds from the tower proved fallacious because they possessed
great wealth."8 ' Second, the church's argument implicating the
free exercise clause was specious since the community house
activities, such as basketball, swimming, and dining, were not
absolutely essential to their religious mission.' It seemed al-
most transparent that the Church was "putting greed ahead
of religion and feigning hardship in an effort to win approval
for a lucrative real estate deal."'6 3
Yet St. Bartholomew's Church is not dispositive on the
issue. Precisely because of case-specific factors, this case does
not settle the issue for state or federal courts. For example,
many religious property owners may not possess the wealth of
St. Bartholomew's and may be able to prove that they cannot
afford the cost of repair. 64 A religious property may also need
to convert existing space into an income-producing asset in
order to fund their religious programs. 6 5 St. Bartholomew's
Church focused the controversy on the community house ac-
tivities, many of which were distinct from the religious prac-
tices of the church, such as sports activities. Where the build-
159. Id. at 354-56.
160. LANDMARK JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 13.
161. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 973.
162. National Trust for Historic Preservation, 8 Preservation L. Rep. 3,006
(1990).
163. Greenhouse, Court Ends Tower Plan at St. Bart's, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5,
1991, at B4, col. 1.
164. Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation, 8 Preservation L. Rep. 3,001, 3,006
(1989).
165. See Landmarking's Double-Edged Sword, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1991, § 10,
at 1, col. 1.
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ing is at issue, particularly the interior, the church may be
able to create a stronger claim which "reaches directly into
the church's worship space."' 66
Boston's landmark law is unique in that it regulates only
the exterior features of churches. In New York City, for exam-
ple, the landmark law specifically exempts the interiors from
regulation. 6 Yet, regulation of the interior of a landmark can
often be as essential as the regulation of the exterior. In
Sameric v. City of Philadelphia,6 s the court upheld the con-
stitutional validity of the designation of interior of commer-
cial space, an Art Deco movie palace. Acknowledging that the
Philadelphia landmark ordinance did not expressly authorize
the designation of interiors, but only "buildings," the court
stated that its construction rested on the fact that interiors
are an essential component of buildings, "particularly where
the interior design reflects the same architectural
elements."""9
Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in St. Barthol-
omew's Church, the test adopted by the Second Circuit for
analyzing the church's claims under the first amendment did
not create binding precedent for any other courts.17 0 Thus
state courts, like those in Society of Jesus and First Cove-
nant, can adopt subjective determinations of whether the
right of free exercise has been infringed. Both Society of
Jesus and First Covenant employed a strict scrutiny test in
their analyses, but the subjective element in their determina-
tions was deciding that landmark preservation was not a
"compelling" interest.' Both of these courts accepted the
churches' challenges at face value, and did not pierce the facts
as did the St. Bartholomew's Church court. For example, the
Society of Jesus court stated that "the mere fact that the
166. Society of Jesus, 409 Mass. at 42, 564 N.E.2d 571, 573.
167. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-303(a)(2) (1986).
168. National Trust for Historic Preservation, 8 Preservation L. Rep. 3,068-3,071
(1989).
169. Id. at 3,069.
170. This test was itself an adaption of the test devised by New York State. See
supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.




Jesuits honestly perceived a restriction ... tends to show the
impact of the Landmark Statute on their religious prac-
tices,"' 2 rather than insisting on empirical proof.
Religious property owners wage these legal battles be-
cause they are the first steps in an attempt to become com-
pletely exempt from the landmark laws. Thus, another issue
which emerges from these three cases is whether landmark
laws should be held invalid when applied to religious proper-
ties. Such a provision, which has already been enacted in sec-
tion 21-69 of the Chicago landmark law, "gives a special status
to religious buildings under Chicago's landmark ordinance. "173
Whenever a church is nominated for landmark status, the
archbishop is vested with a veto power by section 21-69.1 of
the landmark law to reject the designation.17 Unlike most
landowners, whose consent is not a prerequisite to landmark
designation, religious property in Chicago "cannot be desig-
nated a landmark without the owner's express consent. 1 75
The constitutional validity of section 21-69 was recently
questioned in Alger v. City of Chicago.16 In November, 1989,
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Chicago declined to give
his consent to the designation of St. Mary's Church as a
landmark. 7 7 Subsequently, the Landmark Preservation Coun-
cil of Illinois and the National Trust for Historic Preserva-
tion 17 brought suit against the City of Chicago and its agent,
172. Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation, 8 Preservation L. Rep. 3007, 3008
(1989).
173. Alger v. City of Chicago, 748 F. Supp. 617, motion denied, 753 F. Supp. 228,
229 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
174. Alger, 748 F. Supp. 617.
175. Alger, 753 F. Supp. at 229.
176. Alger v. City of Chicago, 748 F. Supp. 617, motion denied, 753 F. Supp. 228
(N.D. Ill. 1990). In September 1990, the plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed for lack
of standing. Alger, 748 F. Supp. at 617. Three months later, the plaintiffs petitioned
the court leave to file an amended complaint. Alger, 753 F. Supp. at 228.
177. Id. at 229.
178. The National Trust for Historic Preservation was created by Congress in
1949. Congress vested the National Trust with the power to own and preserve sites,
buildings and objects significant in American history and culture, and the mission to
"facilitate public participation in that activity." THE NAT'L TRUST FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT at 3. The National Trust is America's largest
historic preservation organization, and serves as an umbrella and support system for
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the Commission of Chicago Landmarks, seeking a declaration
that section 21-69 contravenes the establishment and equal
protection clauses of the federal Constitution.1 79 Standing in
the case was based on the claim that their "'use, enjoyment
and aesthetic appreciation' of St. Mary's was threatened by
the operation of section 21-69.1, due to the consequent possi-
bility that St. Mary's could be altered or demolished."180 The
court dismissed the plaintiffs' case for lack of standing, be-
cause the issue was not ripe since administrative remedies had
not been exhausted.8 1
New York State debated the merits of similar legislation
in the early 1980's. The Walsh-Flynn Bill of 1982 proposed
that religious institutions should be able to "opt-out" of
landmark status at any time.8 ' Ultimately, the bill was de-
feated.1 8 3 Yet, the problems inherent in a landmark law which
allows religious institutions to "opt-out" are legion. If reli-
gious institutions were accorded this privilege, it would be
tragic since, "churches and synagogues are some of the most
significant buildings in any community,"1 8' and many reli-
gious institutions have already expressed the desire to "opt
out" of their landmark designation. 183 In addition, there is
also the danger that the privilege would be extended to all
non-profit institutions in the same way the tax-exempt status
of religious organizations was extended to all non-profit insti-
tutions."8 ' Thus, elective "opt-out" legislation creates the po-
tential for a staggering depletion of landmarks:
millions of community activists in thousands of local and statewide groups. Id. at 4.
For example, the National Trust also participated in the St. Bartholomew's litigation.
See infra notes 87-154 and accompanying text.
179. Alger, 753 F. Supp. at 229-30.
180. Id. at 229.
181. Alger, 748 F. Supp. 617.
182. The New York Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, Should Re-
ligious Properties Be Exempt from Landmark Laws, Occulus, supra note 12, at 3.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d 510, 496 N.E.2d
183, 505 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1986).




For a whole category of buildings to be allowed to be ex-
empt would create a serious precedent ... [I]t has to be
recognized that if one category of tax-exempt owners be-
comes exempt from the landmark laws, then universities,
schools and other not-for-profit owners who also believe
that they have problems and would like to capitalize on
the value of their real estate, may seek to follow. If there
is an exemption built into this law whereby tax-exempt
owners must consent to designation, commercial interests
will also seek such an exemption .... An owner-consent
provision is tantamount to no regulation whatsoever.
1 8 7
St. Bartholomew's Church, Society of Jesus, and First
Covenant, are important, not only for the courts' dispositions
of the specific facts at issue, but also for their analyses of the
notable aspects of the function and structure of municipal
landmark laws. For example, the landmark laws of New York,
Boston, and Seattle, provide extensive due process, giving no-
tice and opportunity to be heard through administrative hear-
ings, which are available to property owners prior to recourse
to judicial actions. The landmark laws also make explicit pro-
visions for future structural changes by providing the certifi-
cate procedure, whereby landmark owners can make reasona-
ble alterations. 18 8
Further, legislatures have made special efforts to accom-
187. Id. at 3, 5.
188. For example, the New York City Commission's Designation Report for St.
Bartholomew's explicitly provides for the possibility of change in the life of the
landmarked building and wants to accommodate it, where possible:
The Landmarks Preservation Commission recognizes that the Landmark and
the Landmark Site are used by St. Bartholomew's Church for religious and
charitable purposes and that, in the future, the Church may consider it nec-
essary to alter or expand the existing structures or erect additional structures
on the Landmark Site. By this designation.., it is not intended to freeze the
structures in their present state or to prevent the alteration or expansion of
existing structures or the erection of other structures needed to meet the
Church's requirements in the future. The Commission believes it has the ob-
ligation and it has the desire to cooperate with owners of Landmarks in such
situations and looks forward to working with representatives of St. Bartholo-
mew's Church should such contingencies occur.
St. Bartholomew's Church and Community House, LP-0275 (New York City
Landmarks Preservation Commission 1967) (Designation).
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modate the needs of non-profit institutions, like churches, in
the landmark laws. Although the structural changes and pro-
posals may not be granted in all situations, the procedures al-
low for appropriate modifications. If the non-profit applicant
cannot afford to make repairs, and can prove that inability,
the laws provide "hardship relief." 89 Another innovative ac-
comodation of non-profit institutions in landmark laws, was
exemplified by a recent amendment to the New York City
landmark law. Recently, the legislature created a second ad-
ministrative review panel for non-profit organizations apply-
ing for a certificate of appropriateness, to insure that their
special needs are adequately considered. 9 '
Landmark commissions have also made special efforts to
accommodate the needs of landmarked urban churches. The
commissions have recommended special property laws which
enable religious and non-profit institutions to obtain a higher
return on their property, and obtain rental income for reli-
gious activities. In New York City, for example, the Transfer
of Development Rights (TDR)' 91 zoning ordinance authorizes
the transfer of development rights "to adjacent lots from lots
occupied by landmark buildings." 92 Through the TDR zoning
ordinance, a church like St. Bartholomew's could be given
property rights to the airspace in a building across the street,
and build a homeless shelter or rent office space to private
developers, without destroying the integrity of their histori-
cally and culturally valuable edifice.
Another observation about landmark laws was raised in
oral arguments for St. Bartholomew's Church. Despite the
availability of judicial review, the church argued, landmark
laws exert a "chilling effect" upon the free exercise of reli-
189. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-309 (Under the "hard-
ship exemption," the commission affords a special exemption from the landmark law
to those non-profit institutions whose financial status conforms to statutory criteria
showing an inability to afford costs of landmark maintenance or repair).
190. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-308 (1986); SEATrLE, WASH., MUN.
CODE, ch. 25.12, § 25.12.670-.830 (1977); 1975 Mass. Acts 772.
191. NEW YORK N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, § 74-79 Transfer of Development Rights





gion.193 The substance of this argument was that the
landmark law makes religious people hesitant to express their
faith "for fear that if circumstances and conditions change...
they may be frozen in those structures.' ' 94 Further, the
landmark law limits the utility of a landmark to the purposes
for which it was being used at the time of its designation, and
"freezes" that purpose in time, despite the changing needs of
the owner. If a church wants to expand its physical plant to
suit its mission, the law may not allow the church to alter the
building. Church owners urged, "[t]here has to be some bal-
ance here, where people don't always make the worship of the
building the whole thing and forget why the building was
built ....
Undeniably, the landmark laws do limit or "chill" an
owner's ability to alter the property, however, the laws also
provide escape valves for an owner, provided by the certificate
procedure and hardship claim."9 6 Finally, the benefits reaped
by the general public from historic preservation aesthetically,
historically and culturally, outweigh the limitations on a few
individual property owners.
VI. Conclusion
The interests of the City and the Church are substantial
and a determination by this court as to the constitution-
ality of the landmarks ordinance will clarify valuable
property rights of churches and their freedom to practice
religion. A decision here will be welcomed throughout the
United States. 9"
Given the growing urgency of this problem, both the pres-
ervation and religious communities believed that the decisions
in Society of Jesus, First Covenant, and St. Bartholomew's
193. Record of Oral Arguments before the Court of Appeals at 5. Bartholomew's
Church, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990).
194. Id. at 4.
195. Battle Rejoined, supra note 5, at col. 4.
196. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
197. First Covenant, 114 Wash. 2d at 399, 787 P.2d at 1355-56.
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Church would resolve the issue of whether landmark laws as
applied to churches violate the right of free exercise. Yet, that
belief has not come to fruition. Since the Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari in both First Covenant and St. Bartholomew's
Church, the Court did not create binding constitutional prece-
dent which federal and state courts would be required to fol-
low. Similarly, the Boston Landmark Commission decided not
to appeal the holding in Society of Jesus, thus none of the
cases are dispositive on the issue.
Examining the Court's treatment of First Covenant and
St. Bartholomew's Church cumulatively, however, offers some
guidance as to the future direction of this legal issue. By the
denial of certiorari in St. Bartholomew's, the Court "let stand
a ruling that the landmark status of St. Bartholomew's
Church does not violate religious freedom." '198 In First Cove-
nant,'99 the Court granted certiorari, but did not write an
opinion. Instead, the Court vacated the holding of the Wash-
ington state court, which had held that Seattle's landmark law
was unconstitutional as applied to religious buildings. The
Justices then instructed the Washington court to reconsider
its ruling in light of the Smith2 0 0 decision, which was the stan-
dard against which the New York City landmark law was
measured in St. Bartholomew's Church. Consequently, the
Court's disposition of the factually-similar First Covenant,
was interpreted as a "strong clue that, at least for a majority




Due to the threats of the "opt-out" legislation, as well as
the ever-increasing urban pressures, a definitive Supreme
Court ruling on the issue is necessary to ensure the strength of
the historic preservation movement in light of this new consti-
tutional challenge. Landmark laws have shown an amazing
flexibility in accommodating the needs of religious property
198. Greenhouse, Court Ends Tower Plan At St. Bart's, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5,
1991, at 1, col. 3.
199. 114 Wash. 2d 392, 787 P.2d (1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1097
(1991).
200. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.




owners, through the availability of the hardship claims, zoning
resolutions, and extra appeals panels. These laws have shown
that it is possible to strike a balance between the competing
interests of the religious property owners and municipal gov-
ernments, rather than negating one interest at the expense of
the other.
Landmarks must be valued by society before they are de-
stroyed, because once destroyed, landmarks are irretrievably
ruined. Legislation designed for the protection of landmarks
must be strengthened, not eroded by specious constitutional
claims, such as those levied in St. Bartholomew's Church,
First Covenant, and Society of Jesus. After all, as a society,
"we will probably be judged not by the monuments we build,
but by those we have destroyed ... 20
202. N. SILVER, LOST NEW YORK 38 (1967).
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